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
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THE LOGICAL COPULA  
AND 73848  
QUANTIFICATION OF  
THE PREDICATE.

BY  
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LONDON  
DAVID NUTT, 270-271, STRAND  
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## PREFACE.

EVERY topic in Elementary Logic has been so thoroughly examined and discussed that epithets, such as "new" and "true," applied to suggestions freshly advanced, assume too frequently the guise of inverse ratios or counter quantities, familiarly exemplified in extension and comprehension. Absit omen.

It is with a generalised signification of the Copula—with the quantification of Terms, and especially of the Predicate—and with the Law of Individuality that the subjoined brief suggestions are concerned. Indeed, so manifestly accurate do they appear that a full recognition of their truth would seem almost a necessary consequence; and, so far as I know, they are new as well as true.

Another topic—the Privative concept, such as the general form "Non-P." represents, employed as an "extempore" term,

is in harmony with Logical Procedure—it simplifies the subordinate Rules of Logic to a great extent; and, in short, renders practicable the reduction of all pure categorical syllogisms to one or other of the two Moods “Barbara” and “Darii.”



## THE LOGICAL COPULA AND QUANTIFICATION OF THE PREDICATE.

THE reciprocal relations—necessary relations—subsisting between attributes and concepts, regarded as products of Thought, or as forms of Thought, occupy so large a portion of the domain of Logic as Pure Science; that modified, controlled, and regulated by the Fundamental Laws of Thought, (as we know them to be), a brief reconsideration of these Laws as to their special operation upon the products of Thought—upon attributes and concepts, as well as upon the necessary relations subsisting between them—may, I venture to hope, extenuate my presumption in submitting some few suggestions, as far as I know, wholly original and new.

The Fundamental Laws of Thought are derived from the Faculty of Reason

Proper, being three in number, and being generally, in due order and succession, known as :

Law I. That of Identity.

Law II. That of Contradiction.

Law III. That of Excluded Middle.

The first Law—that of Identity—insists upon the real identity of every concept with the aggregate of the implied attributes, properties, &c., constituting, and signified by, that concept ; and that, when we predicate any concept, " P." as true of any given Subject, " S." we mean and we really assert that every attribute, property, &c., implied as being a constituent part of the concept, " P." is true also of the Subject, " S."

This law, however, enforces more than this. It formulates the real identity of the concept " P."—the real identity of the aggregate of the attributes, properties, &c., implied in the concept, " P."—with attributes, properties, &c., appertaining to, and implied in, the Subject, " S." ; and which attributes, properties, &c., combined with other attributes, properties, &c., dissimilar indeed, and also more or less

in number, make up and constitute the Subject, "S."

In other words, the Law of Identity asserts the identical existence in both terms, in the Subject as well as in the Predicate; asserts the identical existence therein of all the attributes, properties, &c., that are implied in, and constitute, the predicated concept, "P."

Here I desire emphatically to call especial attention to the Copula—to the Logical meaning of the Copula—as modified and regulated by the First Law of Thought. In compliance with this Law of Identity, the real, true logical sense and signification of the Copula is that of Identical Existence. In stating a simple proposition such as the following: "All animals are organised," we assert, in its strictly logical sense, that the Predicate (organised)—that each and every attribute, property, &c., implied in the predicated concept (organised)—is, severally and respectively, identical with certain attributes, properties, &c., existing also in the Subject (All animals); and which, together with other attributes, properties, &c., dissimilar probably, as well as more or less in

number, make up, and constitute, that Subject (All animals).

In other words, we assert that whatever attributes, properties, &c., are implied in the predicated concept, "P.," exist identically in both the terms, "S.," and "P.," of the proposition, viz., "All animals are organised."

This meaning and signification, thus imposed upon the copula by the First Fundamental Law of Thought is, as follows, thus enunciated adequately

(a) "is, to a certain extent, identical with ;"

(b) "is, in reference to certain implied attributes, identical with."

This signification is quite distinct from the meaning of the Copula in Comprehension, or of that in Extension ; both of which are embraced and generalised by the Copula of Identity of Existence, or of Existing Identically.

In Comprehension, the Copula signifies internal existence reflectively—subjective existence—identical existence with *all* the attributes implied in the Predicate.

In Extension, the Copula signifies objective existence—distributive existence in several individuals, united together and

reduced to unity by the possession of one or more identical concepts or attributes—consequently it also signifies identical existence with a *part* only of the attributes, implied in the Predicate.

This view of the Copula illustrates and explains a much vexed question in Logic—that of the quantification of the Predicate. It explains the quantification of both Terms.

In Comprehension, every attribute, property, characteristic, &c., implied as a constituent of that concept, "P.," which is predicated of the Subject, "S.," is comprehended as existing identically in that Subject "S." If not so comprehended—if only one such attribute, property, characteristic, &c., be not so comprehended in the Subject, we have a contradiction between the terms—between the Predicate P. and the Subject S.; and the Law of Identity is violated. The term P., is not truly predicated of the Subject, S.

Therefore, in comprehension, the Subject S., as the Logical Whole, comprehends all the Predicate P., as a Part—as a Logical Part—comprehends each and every attribute, property, characteristic, &c., implied in that Predicate, P.—com-

prehends each and every attribute, property, &c., as existing identically also in itself, the Subject S.

In Extension, on the other hand, the Subject S. is the Logical Part, and the Predicate P. becomes the Logical Whole: for, in Extension, the Subject is not an attribute, nor concept, but one or more individual examples, instances, cases, contained as such under the Predicate; which itself signifies, not a concept, nor attribute, but a class, an order, an assemblage, or other concatenation of similar individual examples, all of which similar examples or instances—as also the Subject—resemble one another, and are characterised, by the possession of certain implied attributes, properties, &c., existing identically in the subject, as well as in the Predicate; and of which individual examples these implied attributes, properties, &c., constitute the bonds of union, form the connecting links, and thereby reduce them into fictitious unity as a class or genus.

Therefore in Extension, a part only of the Predicate P., exists identically in the Subject S.

Briefly recapitulating, in stating a

simple syllogism such as follows, I may say :

“All Athenians were Greeks ;”

“Socrates was an Athenian ;”

therefore Socrates was a Greek.

Now if our reasoning be in Extension, “Socrates” is an individual case or instance ; and “Athenians” “as well as Greeks” are a class, a genus, or a concatenation of individual cases or instances, thus reduced into fictitious unity by the connecting link, viz., the attribute or concept “Athenian,” existing identically in “Socrates,” “Athenians,” and “Greeks.”

If, however, our reasoning be Comprehensive, we unconsciously form a conception of “Socrates”—we make a rough estimate, an imperfect analysis, of his attributes and characteristics, so that the term or the expression “Socrates” becomes logically a concept—not an individual case or instance. Thus, for example,

“Socrates was Athenian ;”

“All Athenian was Greek ;”

therefore “Socrates was Greek.”

All the attributes, properties, &c., implied in the concept "Greek," exist identically in "Athenian," as likewise do all those, implied in the concept "Athenian," exist identically in "Socrates," considered as a Subject comprehending many attributes.

## LAW II.—THAT OF CONTRADICTION.

Logic being essentially a succession, a consecutive series of comparisons, insists that every such comparison shall be enunciated in words constituting a judgment or proposition; and, further, it is one of the necessary requirements of Logic that all such comparisons, so expressed, shall be duly and fully enunciated in intelligible, unambiguous, and accurate language.

This Second Law of Thought demands the recognition that to every concept, attribute, &c., there appertains its own direct contradictory—that every concept, attribute, &c., "A." has its proper contradictory or privative concept, attribute, &c., "Non-A."—and that this contradictory or privative concept, attribute, &c.,



"Non-A." has the force and signification of a concept or attribute, strictly so considered, in like manner as its contradictory positive concept or attribute may chance to have.

This new, improvised, and (so to say) *pro tempore* concept "Non-A." is in every respect amenable to the requirements laid down by Law I.—by the Law of Identity. This concept Non-A. is, however, far greater in Extension, and, consequently, comparatively shallow in comprehension; but these counter qualities become generalised by the adoption of the Copula of Identical Existence.

Also in Language there is a tendency which supports the view that, in the concept or attribute "Non-A." as representing the contradictory of the concept or attribute A., the privative affix "Non"—the so-called negative "Not"—is really and actually part and parcel of the concept or attribute "Non-A.," and wholly independent of the Copula.

For example, words such as aversion, abortion, abhorrent, eccentric, *dejeuner*, disown, inhuman, immense, measureless, invertebrate, extinct, unaware, unworthy, ignorant, impudent, inanimate, disease,

unconcerned, and a host of other analogous terms illustrate the tendency of Language permanently to attach and affix the privative, and thus to form a new word.

My suggestion is that Logic authorises us to form, and to make use of, temporary expressions or forms of words, such as privative attributes and concepts, represented generally by the forms "Non-A." or "Non-P."

Further, it should be noted that the form of expression of the attribute or concept—whether it assume the form of "A." or of "Non-A."—depends, to a very great measure, upon the point of view from which we chance to regard and consider any object that the Faculty of Comparison may chance to examine.

Thus, what one individual person from his standpoint may hold to be "A." and "Non-B.," will appear to another, from his point of view, "Non-A." and "B.,"; and this remark holds true as to the very same individual person at different epochs of his life.

A rate of speed in travelling, once deemed rapid ("A.") and unsafe ("Non-B."), may in after years be regarded by

the same person as by no means rapid (" Non-A.") and quite safe (" B.").

A mode of sport or occupation that one man may hold to be dangerous ("A.") and unhealthy (" Non-B."), will be considered by another person, judging from an entirely different standpoint, devoid of danger (" Non-A.") and conducive to health (" B.").

These considerations demonstrate that the forms which concepts assume, whether " P." or " Non-P.," when employed to express the properties, characteristics, &c., of an object under survey, depend not so much upon the conditions of the object as upon the varying conditions of the Percipient Subject.

Another example of the privative—the so-called negative—being independent of, and unconnected with, the Copula, but yet modifying one of the terms of a judgment, is afforded by such a proposition as this :

" All men are not sailors " . . . that is to say, " Not all men—some men—are sailors." This is too evident to need comment.

LAW III.—THAT OF THE EXCLUDED  
MIDDLE.

This Law formulates the truth that the two contradictory attributes (viz., "A." and "Non-A.") embrace and include every conceivable object to which these two terms can, from any standpoint, be rationally applied; and Logic as a Science assumes, as a primary condition, the rational, intelligent, and accurate enunciation of all matters submitted to its purview.

This Law authorises the substitution of the proposition "All 'Non-P.' are 'Non-A.'" as equipollent to the proposition All "A." are "P."—no intermediate concept or attribute between "A." and "Non-A.," between "P." and "Non-P.," being thinkable.

The consideration of the Three Fundamental Laws of Thought has induced many authorities to suspect these Laws to be (as it were) three aspects of a Higher Law, rather than three distinct and independent Fundamental Laws, regulating the necessary relations of

attributes and concepts. This matter, however, appertains to Metaphysics—the Three Fundamental Laws being supplied by the Regulative Faculty or Reason Proper.

To my mind it appears probable that there is such a higher Law—a law that might be known as the Law of Individuality, asserting that to every knowable, conceivable object, of which our Faculties make us conscious, there belong and there must belong (whether known or unknown) certain signs, tokens, attributes, characteristics, &c., which mark it off as existent, which determine it, and enable us to distinguish it, more or less dimly, from other objects. It is indeed only by means of signs, attributes, characteristics, &c., that belong to, and distinguish, objects of whose existence we are conscious, that we know anything whatever respecting the objects; or that we even know that they actually exist.

If we assume the hypothesis that there exists such and such object, and that to this object there appertain no properties, no attributes, no characteristics whatever, we should have no means whereby to recognise it as existing; and, as